

CS6846 – Quantum Algorithms and Cryptography

Quantum Cryptography



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
Quantum Key Distribution

Bennett
& Brassard.
1984.

Information
Theoretic
Security.

Protocol:
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Main Property: If bit  $b$  is encoded in an unknown basis, Eve cannot get info about  $b$  w/o disturbing the state.



1). Alice chooses  $n$  random bits  $a_1 \dots a_n$ ,  
&  $n$  random bases,  $b_1 \dots b_n$

$b_i \in \{ \text{Comp}, \text{Had} \}$

Sends  $a_i$  in basis  $b_i$ .

$\{ |0\rangle, |1\rangle \}$   $b=0$

$\{ |+\rangle, |-\rangle \}$   $b=1$

$a_i = 0$ ,  $b_i = 1 \Rightarrow |+\rangle$

2). Bob chooses random bases  $b'_1 \dots b'_n$

& measures received qubits in these.

Gets  $a'_1 \dots a'_n$ .

3) Bob sends  $\{ b'_i \}$  to Alice, Alice sends  
 $\{ b_i \}$  to Bob.

For "matching" positions  $a_i^1 = a_i$

IF Eve did not tamper.

4) Alice selects  $n/4$  locations in shared string & sends Bob  $a_i$  & locations.

If fraction of errors is "high", they abort.

5) If not, they get  $n/4$  shared bits.

## Security Argument:

To transmit bit 0 :  $|0\rangle$  w.p.  $\frac{1}{2}$

$|+\rangle$  w.p.  $\frac{1}{2}$

'' '' '' 1 :  $|1\rangle$  w.p.  $\frac{1}{2}$

$|-\rangle$  w.p.  $\frac{1}{2}$ .

Adversary's strategy:

$$|0\rangle = \cos 0 |0\rangle + \sin 0 |1\rangle$$

$$|+\rangle = \cos \frac{\pi}{4} |0\rangle + \sin \frac{\pi}{4} |1\rangle$$

Eve can measure in the basis

$$\cos \frac{\pi}{8} |0\rangle + \sin \frac{\pi}{8} |1\rangle \quad \left. \begin{array}{l} \text{midway} \\ \text{bet}^n |0\rangle \& |1\rangle \end{array} \right\}$$

$$-\sin \frac{\pi}{8} |0\rangle + \cos \frac{\pi}{8} |1\rangle \quad \left. \begin{array}{l} \text{midway} \\ \text{bet}^n |1\rangle \& |0\rangle \end{array} \right\}$$

$$\Pr(\text{Eve gets } a_i) = \left( \cos \left( \frac{\pi}{8} \right) \right)^2 \approx 0.85$$

Measurement disturbs the state  
by angle  $\geq \frac{\pi}{8}$  so if Bob uses  
same basis as Alice, then his prob.

of recovering incorrect value is  $\geq \sin \left( \frac{\pi}{8} \right)^2$   
 $\approx 0.15$ .

## Quantum one time pad.

Recall: Classical OTP:

Have msg  $m$ , key  $k$ .  $\swarrow$  Random binary  
(same length)

CT:  $m \oplus k$ .

If  $g$  know  $k$ ,  $CT \oplus k = m$ .

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Quantum:

Pauli X Gate : (NOT)

$$\begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

$X|0\rangle = |1\rangle$   
 $X|1\rangle = |0\rangle$ .  
 Let  $a \leftarrow \{0,1\}$ . Then  $X^a |bit\rangle$  is a OTP.

$$m \oplus k$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 X|+\rangle &= |+\rangle \\
 X|-\rangle &= -|-\rangle.
 \end{aligned}$$

Pauli Z gate  $\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 \end{pmatrix}$

$$Z|+\rangle = |-\rangle$$

$$Z|-\rangle = |+\rangle$$

Can compute  $Z^b |\psi\rangle$  &  $b$  random bit.



Let key  $(a, b)$ , random bits

Let  $P$  be an arbitrary mixed state.

$$\begin{bmatrix} \alpha & \beta \\ \gamma & \delta \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\text{Q-OTP Enc}(P, (a, b)) = \overbrace{X^a Z^b P (X^a Z^b)^\dagger}^{\text{CT}}$$

$$\text{Dec}(\text{CT}, (a, b)) : \underbrace{(X^a Z^b)^\dagger}_{\text{unitary}} \text{CT} (X^a Z^b)$$

$$\Rightarrow P.$$

Security:

$$P = \begin{pmatrix} \alpha & \beta \\ \gamma & \delta \end{pmatrix}$$

Four combinations of  $(a, b)$ :

$$\textcircled{1} \quad P = \begin{pmatrix} \alpha & \beta \\ \gamma & \delta \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\textcircled{2} \quad Z P Z^T = \begin{pmatrix} \alpha & -\beta \\ -\gamma & \delta \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\textcircled{3} \quad X P X^T = \begin{pmatrix} \delta & \gamma \\ \beta & \alpha \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\textcircled{4} \quad (XZ) P (XZ)^T = \begin{pmatrix} \delta & -\gamma \\ -\beta & \alpha \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\alpha + \delta = 1.$$

Maximally mixed



Claim:

$$\frac{1}{4} \sum_{a, b \in \{0, 1\}} (X^a Z^b) \cdot P \cdot (X^a Z^b)^T = \frac{1}{2} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

Adding these  $\frac{1}{4} \begin{pmatrix} 2(\alpha + \delta) & 0 \\ 0 & 2(\alpha + \delta) \end{pmatrix} = \frac{1}{2} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$